La sèrie Documents de treball d'economia de l'empresa presenta els avanços i resultats d'investigacions en curs que han estat presentades i discutides en aquest departament; això no obstant, les opinions són responsabilitat dels autors. El document no pot ser reproduït total ni parcialment sense el consentiment de l'autor/a o autors/res. Dirigir els comentaris i suggerències directament a l'autor/a o autors/res, a la direcció que apareix a la pàgina següent.
INTRODUCTION
The research we summarise here has a basic aim of providing more evidence on the issue of the effect on public enterprise (PE) economic performance of the introduction of changes in organisational status and management practices, while keeping the enterprises under public control. That is, how far the 'management-improvement' reforms applied to PE actually generate improvements in their efficiency. Our study is of an in-depth case study type, and refers to the only Spanish public hotel group:
Paradores Nacionales. It is a fully state-owned enterprise, and it has experienced several changes in its organisational status. It operates under competition conditions, that is, under the same conditions prevailing for the other Spanish (private) hotel chains.
There is not specific regulation on the sector.
As changes in the organisational status of a PE we consider here, 1) significant changes in the legal status of the PE, towards more company independence , and 2) that restructuring measures in the PE's have been undertaken, in the sense of changing its organisational structure and introducing new ways of management and/or new ways of reporting & supervision. All these changes and restructuring being oriented to allow for more autonomy in the PE, and to introduce management rules and objectives explicitly oriented to financial results; that is, market oriented criteria. These kinds of measures are usually referred to as: 'to introduce private-company-type management criteria, objectives and practices into a PE'; or as to 'commercialise' the public corporation (Bozec / Dia, 2003) ; or, also, as 'organisational privatisation'. In any case the objective pursued by the government by undertaking these reform/modernising policies is clear: to try to improve PE efficiency without choosing the option of privatising them.
Direct empirical evidence on efficiency improvements yielded by these types of changes in organisational status is at present not extensive; partially because in most cases these reforms come together with changes in the market position of the PE (eg. market liberalisation,) or in the regulation on the sector (Hartley / Parker/ Martin, 1991) , which makes it difficult to determine the specific effect on efficiency attributable to the organisational reforms per se. And, on the other hand, in-depth case studies (which seems a logical approach to analyse these kinds of questions) are not abundant (Curwen, 1988; Aylen, 1999; Beauman, 1996) . Nevertheless, we can also count on some indirect empirical evidence on our issue. Thus, the significant efficiency improvements reported in several studies for the period prior to some PE privatisation (Lynk, 1993; Martin and Parker, 1997; Dewenter / Malatesta, 2001, p. 321; Reeves and Palcic, 2004) tend to be explained precisely in terms of an effect coming from organisational reforms (oriented to financial targets and the other private-like management practices) introduced by the government into the PE during the pre-privatisation period. We can also add to this indirect evidence, that provided by studies that detect efficiency improvements in the remaining state-owned enterprises, in parallel to the privatisation process of other SOE;
i.e., cases where the efficiency of firms -both, privatised and not privatised-improves to a similar degree during the same period (Majumdar, 1998, pp. 17-18; Omran, 2004 ).
And we also have as a related issue the empirical evidence provided by those studies that find no significant differences in efficiency in some PE operating without political constraints, compared to similar private enterprises (Kole / Mulherin, 1997) .
Starting from that background, our case study aims at providing direct empirical evidence on the relationship between the 'organisational privatisation'-type reforms and the degree of efficiency of the affected PE.
APPROACH
The direct government intervention on the firm, that consists in the case of "Paradores" in the government deciding -through a public agency: 'Turespaña'-the sites and buildings for every "Paradores"' hotel, as part of government regional development policy. However, we have verified that no significant change in this constraint has occurred during the period of our study, so, there is no need to take this issue into account in our analysis either. Therefore, our study my be centred on identifying the moments of change in the organisational status of "Paradores", to assess the firm's efficiency for each year of the study period, and to determine the relationship that can be established between both elements; that is, what the impact of this organisational changes on efficiency has been.
Taking into account, when evaluating this observed relationship, the external economic background for the same years: general economic trends and, specifically, the evolution of demand for hotel services .
Defining changes in organisational status
To typify those changes in organisational status that may affect a company's efficiency we rely both on agency theory and on management control literature. From the first we take the idea that when the 'principal' (government, in our case) gives more autonomy to the enterprise management (CEO; the 'agent') then the corresponding fiduciary agency costs will be lower; and, therefore, enterprise efficiency will increase. And we also assume the proposition that the more effective the control the principal exerts on company's management, (supervision system and practise) the more effort the agent/management will put in, so bringing a reduction in efficiency agency costs. On the other hand, the 'best practices' literature on management control tells us that the effectiveness of a control system on a firm's manager will depend basically on appropriate compliance by the principal of three related practical conditions: 1) annual specific targets within the context of long term objectives must be set for the manager of 
Efficiency measurement approach
To measure a firm's economic performance we use three indicators: two measures of financial results, and a productivity index. That is, we work with ordinary operating revenues (OR) and operating costs (OC In using these two performance measures we take into account that they are not independent variables but linked through a well known relationship:
r=m⋅ [OR/(E+FL) ]. Considering this we can say that, especially in the event the two variables should lead to disparate conclusions, the first (m) will be more significant as an efficiency measure, as it comes from confronting in a given way the monetary figures of outputs with those of inputs; while variable r depends on variable m and on variable [OR/(E+FL)] which has more to do with the firm's financial structure (revenues per monetary unit of investment) than with the firm's efficiency per se..
As for a productivity measure, we use the standard total factor productivity index (TFP),
where: q i are the quantities of the 'i' outputs; P i are the prices obtained by the firm for every one; F j stand for the quantities of the 'j' inputs; K j stand for the prices paid by the firm for each input; 'x' stands for the year for which we are determining the productivity; '0' stands for the specific year we take as reference for the change in prices; PI And we complement the former with its annual rate of growth, t = ln(Π x /Π x-1 ).
As usual, the key issue for the calculation of the above productivity index for every year x is how outputs and inputs are measured and how price changes are determined or estimated. As regards outputs, the data obtained have allowed us to distinguish three types of outputs: lodging, food and beverages, and other complimentary services. For each of these three activities we have been able to determine the respective annual revenues (OR x i ), whose relative importance is remarkably constant over the period studied: 48.5 %, 47%, and 4.5%, respectively; (the differences between one year and another do not exceed one percentage point). We have also obtained the physical units associated with the two main activities: number of room-days invoiced (as lodging units), and number of covers served (as food and beverage units). This has allowed us to calculate the average annual prices applied by the enterprise for lodging and for food and beverages, respectively. Both temporal series of prices have been translated into their respective indices of variation (taking year 1992 as a base; the first year we have been able to obtain complete data). Finally for the other 4.5% of revenues we have supposed that the evolution of the enterprise's prices has been equal to the weighted average of the two main blocks of revenues; thereby completing three series of indices of variation for the enterprise's prices (PI i x, 92 ). It has not been necessary to resort to the usual estimations based on indices of external prices.
This has not been the case for inputs. As is usual in applications dealing with total productivity, the information available has not allowed us to determine the average purchasing or contracting prices paid by the enterprise to the many different factors (which are in any case very diverse in a hotel company); nor, therefore, to produce the corresponding indices of variation of prices paid by the enterprise to its factors. Hence 
RESULTS

Identification of relevant changes in the "Paradores" organisational status
Following the approach described in 2.1, we have analysed "Paradores"' successive legal-status and internal organisation changes during the period 1985-2004. To do so, we have relied on annual company reports, related ministry reports, and on in-depth interviews with former and present "Paradores"' managers. As a result we have identified the following relevant changes in organisational status:
(take in Table I) According to the above analysis, we conclude that we can distinguish three relevant moments of change in the organisational status:
1. (1991) The separation of "Paradores" from the Ministerial structure, and its change of legal personality as a limited liability company. However, as we do not have enough information available for the period after the last organisational change to analyse any possible changes in efficiency attributable to these, we have only considered the first two changes; that is we have analysed three sub periods: 1985-1990, 1992-1995, and 1997-2003 .
Efficiency measurements and explanatory variables
Basic variables for efficiency measurement have been produced -according to what is stated above-working on primary data from company annual reports. From this database we have calculated the efficiency indicators described in point 2.. The results are shown in Table II .
(take in Table II) Finally to determine if there has effectively been a relation of cause and effect between the changes in organisational status and variations observed in company efficiency we have carried out a multilateral comparison -using the three efficiency indicators-of the respective average values, before and after the two organisational changes (table III) .
(take in Table III) We can see, therefore, that the change in organisational status when the enterprise changed legally into a Limited Company had a negative impact on economic indicators: an average reduction of over 5 points in the margin rate (statistically significant). A result in contrast to what we expected according to our initial hypothesis based on that such a change in legal personality would imply a higher degree of autonomy for company management and this greater autonomy would be reflected in an improvement in economic indicators. This may be partly explained by 1) the fact that the pace of growth of the activity of the hotel sector decreased notably from one period to the other, after 1991, as a consequence of the general economic crisis caused by the Gulf war (1991) . And the dynamics of "Paradores" evolved in a similar way (columns 6 and 7
and table II); and 2) the organisational change of 1991 was actually purely legal, and did not result in changes in the managing of the company, as we conclude from an in-depth analysis (based on interviews with company managers), and as is shown in our synopsis in table I, in the section 'impact on management policy'.
And in contrast, the second organisational change -in which both the principal and the agent (CEO) change as a consequence of the change in government-is associated with a substantial improvement in economic indicators: an average increase of 8 points in the margin rate; three more than had been lost in the previous period. However, in terms of productivity the improvement is rather more modest: 9%. From the difference between these two increases we can deduce that the improvement in margin after this second change was due in part to the increase in productivity but, above all, to an increase in billing prices much higher than purchasing/contracting prices. It must be pointed out to such relative variations in annual company revenues.
As regards the first relationship (column (6) vs. column (7) in table II), the result obtained (by means of a regression using o.l.s.) allows us to state that, effectively, the correlation is very high: Around 80% of the relative variation in "Paradores"'s turnover is explained by the evolution of the economic situation in the sector. And with reagard to the sensitivity of the productivity (column 3) with respect to this growth in "Paradores" output (growth in real terms, column 5), we have found (using the same technique) that the usual working hypothesis that an increase (decrease) in the level of real activity will lead to in the short term -due to the existence of fixed costs-an increase (decrease) in the relationship outputs / inputs, is true in this case with respect to the indicator of total productivity. From this quantitive analysis -connecting the two above results-we conclude, that of the increase observed in productivity after the second organisational change (+0,0923), approximately half can be attributed to the effect of strong growth in the activity level of the company; that is to a certain type of economies of scale; albeit such output growth for "Paradores" comes explained mostly by the growth in demand in the Spanish hotel sector. Hence, for the improvement observed in productivity for "Paradores" (9%) about the other half can be actually attributed to the organisational changes in 1996.
CONCLUSIONS
We Our results point to the fact that the first apparently relevant change (1991), which made the enterprise going from being a ministerial agency to being a Limited Company was purely formal, as while the enterprise changed its legal status, and the whole formal structure necessary for more management autonomy was established, none of this materialised in internal management's specific actions or policies. Thus, -and even controlling for the role that the unfavourable economic situation played just after 1991 -in this case the standard hypothesis that a change in firm's organisational status towards more autonomy with respect to government intervention will translate into higher company efficiency is not confirmed. A finding that suggests the convenience of a more precise formulation of agency theory where applying to PE, distinguishing between changes in status that allow for more enterprise autonomy, on the one hand, and effective use of this possibility by managers on the other.
In contrast, the second relevant organisational change here analysed, 1996, when both principal and agent (CEO) changed, appears to really be an effective management reform; new inside management techniques were applied, and specific strategies aimed at improving quality and management practices are adopted. And we observe, in parallel, a strong favourable change in efficiency indicators: productivity increases moderately but the margin rate shows a large increase, reaching high positive levels.
However, this impressive improvement in economic performance was not so much due to an increase in company productivity but mainly to 1) a relative increase in billing prices and 2) an improvement in the economic situation of the Spanish hotel sector.
Nevertheless, we can say that in this case the change of both principal and agent seems to have been a determining factor to put into effect the possibilities of more enterprise autonomy which were established five years earlier.
To sum up, the above conclusions suggest that in future studies on the effect of management reforms on the economic performance of public enterprises more attention should be paid to the fact that a certain period of time may be required for the potentialities that a particular reform may offer become effective; and that one of the fostering conditions for this effectiveness may be the firm's key position, specially the CEO, be actually prepared to change accordingly as far as the ways of managing and running the firm.
--- Table I Assessment of the relevant changes in organisational status 4. Emphasis put on quality gastronomy and sustainable development.
R&D is reinforced
6. A strong expansion plan is initiated which plans the opening of new establishments until 2010 (creating more than 500 jobs).
7. The offer is segmented in 7 groups: sun and beach, health, nature, historical heritage, golf and sport, family and companies.
Important increase
Change of 'principal'
Change of 'agent'
No changes
Continuist policy
Actions which foster growth are continued 
0.8
0.0237 0.00897 (*). Not enough data for years before 1991 (neither annual accounts nor management reports exist for the company; only the annual budget payment). (**) At constant prices. Column (7): Source: Own production, from annual figures of added value for the Hotel sector, obtained from the Spanish Hotel Federation. Barcelona (1994 Barcelona ( -1997 
